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Strengthening the War Powers Resolution:

The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions
The laws are silent amidst the clash of arms.
-Cicero,

Pro Milone

Michael J. Glennon*
In the aftermath of the long and bitter debate over United
States military involvement in Vietnam, Congress determined
"to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution . . . [by
ensuring] that the collective judgment of both the Congress and
the President" 1 would apply to future exercises of the warmaking powers. The War Powers Resolution,2 enacted over
President Nixon's veto in 1973,3 restricts the duration of any
* Assistant Counsel, Office of the Legislative Counsel, United
States Senate. The views expressed herein are those of the author.
1. War Powers Resolution § 2(a), 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (a) (Supp.
1975) [hereinafter cited as Resolution].
2. The War Powers Resolution is set forth in the Appendix, infra.
3. Joint Resolution of Nov. 7, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555.
In his veto message the President explained that
Ew] hile I am in accord with the desire of the Congress to assert
its proper role in the conduct of our foreign affairs, the restrictions which this resolution would impose upon the authority
of the President are both unconstitutional and dangerous to the
best interests of our Nation.
Message from Richard Nixon to the House of Representatives, Oct. 24,
1973, in 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION or PREsmENTL Docu1ENTs 1285
(1973). The President's constitutional objection was essentially that the
Resolution "would attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act,
authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years." Id. at 1286. The President's assertion
represents one viewpoint in the controversy over the proper interpretation of the constitutional allocation of war-making powers between the
President and Congress. See notes 19-29 infra and accompanying text.
The President's conclusion that the Resolution would be "dangerous
to the best interests of our Nation" derived from his opinion that it
would "seriously undermine this Nation's ability to act decisively and
convincingly in times of international crisis." Message from Richard
Nixon to the House of Representatives, Oct. 24, 1973, in 9 WEEKLY
ComPILATIoN or PRESmENTIAL DocUMENTs 1285, 1286 (1973). He hypothesized that had the Resolution been in effect in recent years, "[w] e may
well have been unable to respond in the way we did during the Berlin
crisis of 1961, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Congo rescue operation in 1964, and the Jordanian crisis of 1970-to mention just a few
examples." Id.
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involvement of United States armed forces in "hostilities" or in
"situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances," when the introduction of those
forces occurs without a declaration of war. 4

It requires the

President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours after
any such introduction of the armed forces,5 and to terminate the
involvement within 60 days after the report was or should have

been submitted,6 or sooner "if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution." 7 The Resolution also requires the President to

consult with Congress before and during such involvements,8 and
to report to Congress when forces are deployed in certain other
situations. 9 These are the only provisions of the Resolution that

restrict presidential use of the armed forces. 10 A "Purpose and
Policy" section" expresses the understanding of Congress as
to the scope of the President's constitutional power to independ-

ently introduce the armed forces into hostilities, 12 but it contains no mandatory language.
The President's veto message was apparently written before enactment of the Resolution, on the assumption that the conference committee would report the Senate version of the Resolution. It did not.
See text accompanying note 13 supra.
4. Resolution § 4(a) (1). For the sake of convenience, and unless
otherwise indicated, the word "hostilities" will hereinafter encompass
"situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances," as well as hostilities per se.
5. Id. § 4(a). The report must set forth the circumstances
necessitating, the legal authority for, and the estimated duration of the
involvement. Id. § 4(a) (A) - (C). In addition, the President must
report periodically on the status of the involvement. Id. § 4(c).
6. Id. § 5(b). The 60-day period may be extended up to 30 days
if the President determines and certifies to Congress in writing that
the safe removal of the troops so requires. Id. This automatic termination does not apply if Congress has declared war, specifically authorized
the involvement, extended the 60-day period, or is "unable to meet
as a result of armed attack upon the United States." Id.
7. Id. § 5(c).
8. Id. § 3.
9. Id. § 4.
10. Other provisions of the Resolution require that Congress give
expedited consideration to a concurrent resolution terminating hostilities,
id. § 7, and to proposals to extend the 60-day limit on involvement, id.
§ 6; prohibit the inference that any law or treaty authorizes introduction
of the armed forces into hostilities, unless such law or treaty "states that
it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization [for the introduction] within the meaning of this joint resolution," id. § 8(a); and
states that the Resolution does not alter the constitutional authority of
the President or Congress or grant any authority to the former that "he
would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution." Id. § 8 (d).
11. Id. § 2.
12. Id. § 2(c).
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The Resolution, then, imposes only what may be termed
"subsequent limitations" upon the President's use of the armed
forces. This contrasts with the Senate version of the Resolution,
rejected by the conference committee, which would have also
imposed "prior restraints." It would have stated in operative
terms, rather than merely as the understanding of Congress, the
circumstances in which the armed forces may be introduced into
hostilities without a declaration of war.1 3 The Senate version
differed from the Resolution in two other important respects,
It would have explicitly allowed the President to introduce the
armed forces to evacuate United States citizens and nationals
abroad in certain emergency situations,14 and, by avoiding reference to the Constitution in defining the circumstances in which
the President could independently engage the armed forces in
hostilities, it would have avoided indicating that the President
has a constitutional right to act independently in those circumstances.'
13.
3 that

The bill, introduced by Senator Jacob Javits, provided in section

[iln the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress,
the Armed Forces of the United States may be introduced in
hostilities, or in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, only(1) to repel an armed attack upon the United States,
its territories and possessions; to take necessary and appropriate retaliatory actions in the event of such an attack;
and to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an
attack;
(2) to repel an armed attack against the Armed Forces
of the United States located outside of the United States,
its territories and possessions, and to forestall the direct
and imminent threat of such an attack;
(3) to protect while evacuating citizens and nationals
of the United States, as rapidly as possible, from (A) any
situation on the high seas involving a direct and imminent
threat to the lives of such citizens and nationals, or (B)
any country in which such citizens and nationals are
present with the express or tacit consent of the government of such country and are being subjected to a direct
and imminent threat to their lives, either sponsored by such
government or beyond the power of such government to
control; but the President shall make every effort to terminate such a threat without using the Armed Forces of
the United States, and shall, where possible obtain the
consent of the government of such country before using
the Armed Forces of the United States to protect citizens
and nationals of the United States being evacuated from
such country; or
(4) pursuant to specific statutory authorization ....
S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973).
14. Compare id. § 3 (3), with Resolution § 2 (c).
15. Compare S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973), quoted in mote
13 supra, with Resolution § 2(c). The controversy over the proper

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 1

To date, four events-the Mayaguez incident and three military actions relating to the evacuation of American and other
nationals from South Vietnam and Cambodia-have caused the
President to submit a report to Congress under the Resolution.
This Article suggests that the inability of the Resolution to control the President's use of the armed forces during those and
similar crises necessitates amendment of the Resolution to ininterpretation of the constitutional allocation of war-making powers
between the President and Congress is discussed generally in notes 19-29
infra and accompanying text.
Section 2(c) of the Resolution reflects a compromise reached in
conference committee between section 3 of the Senate bill and the House
bill, H.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which contained no
provision similar to either of those sections. (Otherwise the two bills
were essentially similar, except that the Senate bill's counterpart of
Resolution § 5(b) provided a basic 30-day limit, S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 5 (1973), while that of the House bill, H.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 4(b) (1973), allowed 120 days.) The prior restraints provision of the Senate bill was opposed on primarily two grounds. Some
considered the President's powers to be more extensive than those recognized by that provision. Senator Strom Thurmond, for example, expressed this view during debate on the bill:
The legislation provides only four situations in which an
immediate response is allowed, and it may well be questioned
whether it is possible to define and describe in advance all
possible potential emergency situations to which the President
might be called on to respond.
...It should also be pointed out that some constitutional
law experts maintain that the independent authority of the
President under the Constitution is substantially broader than
the four categories specified in the bill.
119 CONG. REc. 25,104 (1973). Similarly, Senator Griffin believed that
section 3 was "an arbitrary restriction" on the President's constitutional
powers. Id. at 25,099.
Others expressed a contrary fear-that "spelling out" powers not
recognized by the Constitution would only support further presidential
usurpation of the war-making powers by providing statutory language
on which unconstitutional military operations could be based. Senator
Fubright observed:
The list of conditions spelled out in Section 3 of the bill is, in
my opinion, about as precise and comprehensive a list as can be
devised, and its purpose, I fully recognize, is not to expand
Presidential power but to restrict it to the categories listed.
Nevertheless, I am apprehensive that the very comprehensiveness and precision of the contingencies listed in Section 3 may
be drawn upon by future Presidents to explain or justify military initiatives which would otherwise be difficult to explain
or justify. A future President might, for instance, cite "secret"
or "classified" data to justify almost any conceivable foreign
military initiative as essential to "forestall the direct and imminent threat" of an attack on the United States or its armed
forces abroad.
S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3,C-35 (1973) (supplemental views
of J.W. Fulbright).
The absence of prior restraints in the House bill and in the Resolution itself, on the other hand, was opposed on the ground that it

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
elude prior restraints of the sort contained in the Senate bill.16
The Ford administration, however, has indicated that it considers
unconstitutional both the subsequent limitations contained in the
Resolution and such prior restraints. At least with respect to
the prior restraints, some members of Congress share this viewas is illustrated by the rejection of the Senate version of the
Resolution. 17 These objections create the danger that a President will consider himself justified in ignoring the subsequent
limitations and any prior restraints that Congress enacts. Thus
the Article also proposes that Congress obviate that danger by
employing funding prohibitions to enforce both subsequent limitations and prior restraints. Its thesis is that, whatever the
constitutional scope of the presidential war-making power, Congress can and should effectively limit the exercise of that power
by means of its exclusive power over the purse.' s
After an introductory discussion of the constitutional allocation of the war-making powers between the President and
Congress, the Article lays the foundation for these ideas by
examining the legislative and executive responses to the recent
events in Southeast Asia. It then examines the current political
status of the power over the purse and the constitutional support
for its use in the present context. It concludes by elaborating
the proposals outlined above and other less crucial possibilities
for strengthening the Resolution.
rendered ineffectual any legislation purporting to inhibit presidential
initiation of wars unwanted by Congress. Thus Senators Thomas
Eagleton and Gaylord Nelson, cosponsors of the Senate bill, voted
against the Resolution. Senator Eagleton explained:
If we are reluctant to deal with the constitutional issue of
prior authority, then we will continue to be confronted in years
to come with the prospect of desperately trying to stop misbegotten wars.
War powers legislation that is meaningful has to deal with
the fundamental causes of the constitutional impasse that
plagued the Nation for the past decade. It must, in my judgment, in the most precise legal language, carefully spell out
those powers which adhere to the Executive by reason of his
status as Commander in Chief and his obligation to act in
emergencies to repel attacks upon the Nation, its forces, and
its citizens abroad. For the rest, such legislation must make
clear that all remaining decisions involved in taking the Nation
to war are reserved to the elected representatives of the
people-as the Constitution so says, the Congress.
119 CONG. REc. 33,557 (1973). Representative Elizabeth Holtzman also
voted against the Resolution, stating that "it does not prevent the
commencement of an illegal war, but allows one to continue for from
60 to 90 days." Id. at 33,972 (1973).
16. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973), quoted in note 13 supra.
17. See note 15 supra.
18. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7.
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THE WAR-MAKING POWERS

The scope of the President's power to make war has been
the subject of much controversy in recent years. 19 The wide
divergence of opinion is illustrated by a comparison of the most
recent statement on the matter by Congress, section 2(c) of the
War Powers Resolution, with the opinion of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Advisor to the State Department. The Resolution states:
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific
statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or
its armed forces.
Mr. Leigh, on the other hand, believes:
Besides the three situations listed in subsection 2(c) of the
War Powers Resolution, it appears that the President has the
constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to rescue
American citizens abroad, to rescue foreign nationals where such
action directly facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens abroad, to
protect U.S. Embassies and Legations abroad, to suppress civil
insurrection, to implement and administer the terms of an
armistice or cease-fire designed to terminate hostilities involv-

ing the United States, and to carry out the terms of security
commitments contained in treaties. We do not, however, believe
that any such list can be a complete one, just as we do not
believe that any single definitional statement can clearly
President's
encompass every conceivable situation in which the
20
Commander in Chief authority could be exercised.
It is not the purpose of this Article to explore the merits
of this controversy; indeed, the proposition advanced here is that
the scope of the President's war-making power is irrelevant insofar as Congress refuses to provide funds for unwanted presidential uses of the armed forces. For present purposes, then, it
will suffice to make the following points: First, the Constitution's
textual grants of war-making power to the President are paltry in
comparison with, and are subordinate to, its grants to Con19. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, THE PRESSIDENT: OFFICE MM POWERS 17871957 (4th rev. ed. 1957); M. Pussy, Tus WAY WE Go TO WAR (1969); A.
ScHLEsIN.ER, JR., THE IvPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); F. WOPMUTH, THE
WAR: THE PszsiD=rr vERsus rE CONSTiTuzrON (1968); Corwin,
The President'sPower, in THE PRESIDENT: ROLE AND POWERS 361 (1965);

V ETNA

and sources cited in notes 21, 23, and 26 inra.
20. Hearings on Compliance with the War Powers Resolution
Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs
of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
90-91 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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gress; 21 moreover,

original

constitutional materials indicate

21. As indicated by the testimony of Mr. Leigh, see text accompanying note 20 supra, the primary source of the President's warmaking power, whatever it scope, is the commander-in-chief clause:
"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States ...
" U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Article II, section 1, clause 1, vests the "executive Power" of the
United States in the President. This clause is properly viewed not as
a grant of independent authority to the chief executive, but rather as
imposing upon him the duty to "take Care that the Laws [including
treaties and customary international laws] be faithfully executed," art.
II, § 3. Nevertheless, it has been cited by Presidents as justification for
their claims that United States treaty commitments authorized them to
send troops abroad for purposes short of war, even when Congress had
not enacted implementing legislation. See L. HENmKn, FoRaIrN A.Ams
AwD THE CoNsTITuTIoN 55 (1972) (citing examples) [hereinafter cited
as HENmw].
The grants to Congress of war-related powers are numerous:
Article I, section 8, vests Congress with the power "to lay and collect
Taxes ... to ... provide for the common Defense," clause 1; "[t]o
define and punish... Offenses against the Law of Nations," clause 10;
"[t]o declare War," clause 1; "[tlo raise and support Armies .. ."
clause 12; "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy," clause 13; "[t]o make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces," clause 14; "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,"
clause 15; and "[t] o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States," clause 16.
Also important in this regard are the general provisions vesting in
Congress "[a]U legislative Powers" granted to the federal government,
art. I, § 1, cl. 1; the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution .. . all ... powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof," art. I, § 8, cl. 13; and the exclusive
power to appropriate funds from the Treasury, art. I, § 9, cl. 7. The
first of these, in conjunction with article II, section 1, clause 1, placing
the "executive Power" in the President, establishes Congress as the
fount of federal laws and the President as their executor.
The second, as the late Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale Law
School has noted, gives to Congress the sole power to implement not
only its own powers, but also those of the Executive:
Whatever is needed to flesh out the slender recital of Executive functions must be done by Congress under the "necessaryand-proper" clause. Congress alone can make the laws which
will carry into execution the powers of the Government as a
whole, and of its officers, including the President.
Hearings on War Powers Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 551 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
War Powers Legislation]. Note, in this context, that section 2 (b) of
the War Powers Resolution cites the "necessary-and-proper" clause as
authority for the Resolution, emphasizing that that clause authorizes
Congress to implement "not only its own powers but also all other
powers vested ... in the Government ... or in any department or
officer thereof." For a discussion of the power over the purse in the
war powers context see notes 100-39 infra and accompanying text.
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that the Framers intended a narrowly circumscribed presidential
war-making power, with the commander-in-chief clause conferring minimal policy-making authority 22 and no authority to
22. Writing in 1793, Madison, the principal architect of the Constitution, addressed the problem of executive power to make war:
Every just view that can be -taken of this subject, admonof the
of a rigid adherence to the
ishes
simple,the
thepublic
received,
andnecessity
the fundamental
doctrine of the constitution, that the power to declare war, including the power of
in
and
exclusively
judging of the causes of war, is fully
case, to
in anyvested
no right,
the legislature; that the executive has
declarfor
cause
not
is
or
is
there
decide the question, whether
ing war; that the right of convening and informing congress,
whenever such a question seems to call for a decision, is all the
right which the constitution has deemed requisite or proper
VI Tnn WnRINGs OF JAImES MADisoN 174 (G. Hunt, ed. 1906).
Likewise Thomas Jefferson. In an oft-quoted letter to Madison
in 1789, he wrote:
We have already given in example one effectual check to
the dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose
from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are
to spend to those who are to pay.
15 THE PAPERS OF THOmAS JEFFmSON 397 (J. Boyd ed. 1958).

Alexander Hamilton, among the founding fathers a relative admirer
of the executive, concurred:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation
to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind as
those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world
to the sole disposal of a magistrate, created and circumstanced,
as would be a president of the United States.
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 505-06

(J. Cooke ed. 1961)

(A. Hamilton).

And in Federalist No. 69 he explained the commander-in-chief clause:
[T]he President is to be Commander in Chief of the army
and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority
would be nominally the same with that of the King of GreatBritain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount
to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the
confederacy; while that of the British King extends to the
declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets
and armies; all which, by the Constitution under consideration,
would appertain to the Legislature.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
The Framers' concept of the commander in chief as "first general"
derives from the relationship between the Continental Congress and
General Washington during the Revolutionary War. The commission
given Washington as commander in chief reflects the subordination of
that officer to the will of Congress. After reciting their "especial trust
and confidence" in Washington and enjoining him to cause "strict
discipline and order to be observed in the army and that the soldiers
are duly exercised and provided with all convenient necessaries," the
commission concluded:
And you are to regulate your conduct in every respect by
the rules and discipline of war (as herewith given you) and
punctually to observe and follow such orders and directions
from time to time as you shall receive from this or a future
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independently commit the armed forces to combat, except in
order to repel "sudden attacks. ' 23 Second, early Presidents
Congress of the said United Colonies or a committee of Congress
for that purpose appointed.
THE WASHINGTON PAPERS 124-25 (S. Padover ed. 1955).

Professor Louis Henkin of Columbia Law School has noted in this
connection that generals, "even when they are 'first,' do not determine
the political purposes for which troops are to be used; they command
them in the execution of policy made by others." HENKim, supra note
21, at 50-51.
23. Early drafts of the Constitution gave Congress the power to
"make war." On the motion of James Madison and Eldridge Gerry
"declare" was substituted for "make." 2 THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). The reason given

in Madison's notes was to "[leave] to the Executive the power to repel
sudden attacks." Id. at 318. Rufus King added that "'make' war might
be understood to 'conduct' it which was an Executive function." Id.
at 319.
It has been argued that the change from "make" to "declare"
recognized "the warmaking authority of the President, implied by his

role as executive and commander-in-chief and by congressional power
to declare, but not make, war." Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking
Power-Legislative, Executive and Judicial Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
461, 467 (1971). But, as Professor Raoul Berger of Harvard Law School
points out in refuting this contention, the commander-in-chief clause
conferred only the first generalship of the forces and the "executive
powers .

..

do not include the rights of war and peace."

Berger, War-

Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 41 (1972) (citing 1 THE
REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66-67 (M. Farrand ed.
1911)) [hereinafter cited as Berger]. Professor Berger concludes that
"[o]nly in a very limited sense-command of the armed forces plus
authority to repel sudden attacks--can one accurately refer to a presidential war-making power." Id. Professor Berger adds that the sudden
attacks to be repelled were those on the United States or its armed
forces, id. at 42 & n.99, not on its allies. He also makes a cogent
argument, based on original materials, that the term "sudden attacks"
was not meant to include threats of attack, for in such cases the ability
of Congress to respond promptly would obviate the need for immediate
presidential action that the change from "make" to "declare" had
recognized. Id. at 43-45.
Section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution conforms precisely, it
will be noted, with Professor Berger's views. The Senate version of
the Resolution, on the other hand, would have allowed the President
to use force to evacuate United States citizens and nationals in certain
emergency situations, S. 440, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(3) (1973), see
note 13 supra, and to "forestall direct and imminent" threats of attack
on the United States, its territories and possessions, and its armed
forces abroad, id. §§ 3(1) -(2), see note 13 supra. But the Senate version
did not indicate that such uses were the constitutional prerogative of
the President. See text accompanying note 15 supra. Addressing the
"forestall direct and imminent" threats provision of this bill, Professor
Berger concluded that it represented a constitutionally permissible delegation of power. Berger, supra, at 45-47. The evacuation provision
might have been similarly viewed; on the other hand, there is some
reason to believe that the Framers intended that the President be able

10
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generally respected the primacy of Congress in the war powers
area, 24 but in recent decades Presidents have assumed the
to use force to rescue United States citizens abroad when there is no time
for Congress to authorize such use and Congress has not explicitly
prohibited it. See note 24 infra (message of President Jefferson).
24. See War Powers Legislation, supra note 21, at 75 et seq. (testimony of Professor Richard B. Morris of Columbia University); Presidential Statements Acknowledging Need for Explicit Congressional
Exercise of the War Power, app. A to Statement of Leon Friedman,
Special Counsel, ACLU, id. at 805-08; Berger, supra note 23, at 61-63.
Two examples are particularly relevant to this Article in that they
reflect not only presidential deference to the congressional war-making
power, but also presidential recognition of the need for congressional
authorization of the funds necessary to any use of the armed forces.
Confronted with a dispute with Spain on the Florida border, President
Jefferson requested instruction from Congress:
That which they have chosen to pursue will appear from the
documents now communicated. They authorize the inference
that it is their intention to advance on our possessions until
they shall be repressed by an opposing force. Considering that
Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the power of
changing our condition from peace to war, I have thought it my
duty to await their authority for using force in any degree
which could be avoided. I have barely instructed the officers
stationed in the neighborhood of the aggressions to protect our
citizens from violence, to patrol within the borders actually
delivered to us, and not to go out of them but when necessary
to repel an inroad or to rescue a citizen or his property; and the
Spanish officers remaining at New Orleans are required to
depart without further delay....
But the course to be pursued will require the command of
means which it belongs to Congress exclusively to yield or to
deny. To them I communicate every fact material for their
information and the documents necessary to enable them to
judge for themselves. To their wisdom, then, I look for the
course I am to pursue, and will pursue with sincere zeal that
which they shall approve.
Message from Thomas Jefferson to the Senate and House of Representatives, Dec. 6, 1805, in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
389-90 (J. Richardson ed. 1897) (emphasis added).
President Jackson similarly looked to Congress for guidance and
"means" when United States shipping was plagued by marauders in
South American waters:
In the course of the present year one of our vessels, engaged
in the pursuit of a trade which we have always enjoyed without
molestation, has been captured by a band acting, as they pretend,
under the authority of the Government of Buenos Ayres. I
have therefore given orders for the dispatch of an armed
vessel to join our squadron in those seas and aid in affording
all lawful protection to our trade which shall be necessary,
and shall without delay send a minister to inquire into the
nature of the circumstances and also of the claim, if any, that
is set up by that Government to those islands. In the meantime,
I submit the case to the consideration of Congress, to the end
that they may clothe the Executive with such authority and
means as they may deem necessary for providing a force adequate to the complete protection of our fellow-citizens fishing
and trading in these seas.
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power to involve the armed forces in "full scale and sustained
warfare." 25 In this connection it is debated whether repeated
exercise by one branch of the government of a power not granted
to it by the Constitution accomplishes, by some process analogous
26
to adverse possession, constitutional possession of that power,
1 STATE OF THE UNIoN MEssAGEs OF THE PRESIDENTS

1790-1966, at 352

(F. Israel ed. 1966) (emphasis added).

25. S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1967). A 1966 State
Department memorandum states that "[s]ince the Constitution was
adopted there have been at least 125 instances in which the President
has ordered the armed forces to take action or maintain positions
abroad without obtaining prior Congressional authorization, starting
with the 'undeclared war' with France (1798-1800)." OFFICE OF THE
LEAL AnVIsoR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE LEGALITY OF THE UNITED
STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF VIETNAM , reprinted in 75
YALE L.J. 1085, 1101 (1966).

It has been demonstrated, however, that "most of these [instances]
were relatively minor uses of force." See Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S.
934, 936 (1967)

(Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting statement of Under

Secretary of State Nicolas Katzenbach);

Corwin, The President's

Power, in THE PREsIDmr: ROLE AND PowERs 361 (1965) (the "vast
majority" of the instances "involved fights with pirates, landings
of small naval contingents on barbarous or semi-barbarous coasts [to
protect American citizens], the dispatch of small bodies of troops to
chase bandits or cattle rustlers across the Mexican border"); Wormuth,
The Vietnam War: The President Versus the Constitution, in 2 THE
VIETNAm

WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw

711, 740-54 (1969).

Examining

these and other authorities, Professor Berger concludes that "'only since
1950 have Presidents regarded themselves as having authority to
commit the armed forces to full scale and sustained warfare.'" Berger,
supra note 23, at 67 (quoting S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24
(1967)).
26. See, e.g., War Powers Legislation, supra note 21, at 551 (testimony of Alexander Bickel):
The text of the Constitution and its history thus plainly
limit the President. But the law of the Constitution under our
system is defined not only by the text and by the history of
the text, but by practice long accepted. The earliest practice,
as the committee has heard conformed to the division of warmaking powers envisioned by the framers. But later practice,
which again has been recited to this committee in the hearings
of 1967 and more recently, the later practice, particularly in this
century, has gone beyond.
See also McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National
Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945) ("continuance of [a] practice by successive administrations throughout our history makes its contemporary
constitutionality unquestionable"). But compare Berger, supra note 23,
at 57-58 (footnotes omitted), challenging this doctrine of "adaptation
by usage":
To a believer in constitutional government, in the separation of powers as a safeguard against dictatorship, there is no
room for a take-over by the President of powers that were
denied to him and, as our own times demonstrate, denied with
good reason .
For me Washington's advice remains the
pole-star:
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but what little Supreme Court attention has been addressed to
this issue denies such a doctrine.27 Third, the case law is lean
in the war powers area in general, giving original constitutional
materials primary significance, 28 but the cases do suggest that
The power,
necessity
reciprocal
checks in the
exercise
of
political
by of
dividing
and distributing
it into
different
depositories, and constituting each the Guardian of the
Public Weal against invasion by the others, has been
evinced. .

...

To preserve them must be as necessary as to

institute them. If in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the Constitutional powers be in
any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment
in the way in which the Constitution designates. But let
there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one
instance, may be the instrumenl of good, it is the customary
weapon by which free governmnents are destroyed. The
precedent must always greatly over-balance in permanent
evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any
time yield.
In any event, it is clear that the congressional war powers have not
diminished with disuse. Thus Professor Bickel's testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
Whatever aggrandizement of Presidential power may have
occurred during the past generation, whether or not Presidential
initiatives taken in the absence of legislation to the contrary
were constitutional, the practice of recent decades or of a
century cannot have worked a reduction of congressional power,
which may in the last two or three decades have lain largely
in disuse, but which is as legitimate now as the day it was
conferred.
War Powers Legis~atio, supra note 21, at 555.
27. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that in
judging the qualifications of its members under article I, section 5,
Congress is limited to the qualifications expressly prescribed by the
Constitution), Chief Justice Warren stated, in an opinion for seven of
the Justices, "[t]hat an unconstitutional action has been taken before
surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a
later date." Id. at 546-47.
28. Generally, all now know, the Constitution is what the
Supreme Court says it is, but since the Court has not said much
about its foreign affairs aspects, and promises to say little more,
many of these have no final, "infallible" arbiter and expositor
and are "resol ved"t onl and hcwithout resolutio in principe.
men) take constitutional positions and provide precedents to
encourage even their weaker successors, but the issues remain
to be fought again some new day. If old and not-so-old
Supreme Court constitutional decisions do not escape reexamination, there is even less stare decisis for what former Presidents and earlier Congressmen asserted in word or action. And
so, major constitutional issues of forelgn policy today are at
bottom the struggles for constitutional power of our early
history. The world is changed, the United States is changed,
the institutions of government are changed, the Constitution
itself is changed, but the constitutional materials, the Federalist
Papers, the debates of Hamilton versus Jefferson or Hamilton
versus Madison, remain fresh and relevant and are played back
again and again by new voices in new contexts.
HnNExn, supra note 21, at 5, 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
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the power of the President is at low ebb when he acts in
opposition to the express will of Congress.29
II. OPERATION OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
DURING THE EVACUATIONS FROM CAMBODIA AND
VIETNAM AND THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT
The four events that have given rise to the submission of
reports required by the War Powers Resolution must be viewed,
for present purposes, in the light of a group of statutory provisions that Congress enacted between 1973 and 1975 in order to
terminate and prevent further United States military involvement in Southeast Asia. The common effect of these essentially
similar provisions is to prohibit the use of funds to finance "combat activities" and other "military or paramilitary operations"
"in," "over," and "off the shores of" North and South Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia.30
29. In his famous concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube

Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Justice Jackson espoused the
following theory of the relationship between presidential action and
the will of Congress:
[Presidential action] pursuant to an Act of Congress would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation ....
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, in-

difference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility ....

When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest

ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional

powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter.
Id. at 637.
30. There are seven such provisions. Section 30 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1973 is typical except in referring to "military or
paramilitary operations" rather than to "combat activities" or "involvement . . . in hostilities." Section 30 provides: "No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended to
finance military or paramilitary operation by the United States in or
over Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia." 87 Stat. 732. The other provisions
are: Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1975 Pub. L. No. 93-437,
§ 839, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Aim.

NEws 1400 (1974); Department

of Defense Appropriations Act, 1974 § 741, 87 Stat. 1045; Department
of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974, § 806, 87 Stat. 615
(1973); Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973
§ 13, 87 Stat. 454; Joint Resolution of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-52,
§ 108, 87 Stat. 134; Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973 § 307,

87 Stat. 129.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 1

A. THE EVACUATIONS AND THE VIETmAm CONTINGENCY ACT
The first report was submitted on April 4, 1975. 31

Three

days earlier Cambodian Premier Lon Nol had left the capital,
Phnom Penh, as Khmer Rouge insurgents closed in on the
city.32 South Vietnamese forces had abandoned more than twothirds of their country to the North Vietnamese. 33 President Ford,
"taking note of the provision of section 4(a) (2) of the War
Powers Resolution, ' 34 reported that he had ordered United
States naval vessels carrying some 700 marines, equipped for
combat, into the territorial waters of South Vietnam. Their "sole
mission," the President said, was to "assist in the evacuation [of
"refugees and U.S. nationals,"]

including the maintenance of

order on board the vessels engaged in that task."3 5
On April 10, the President, addressing a joint session of Congress, asked it to "clarify immediately its restrictions on the use
of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the limited purposes" of evacuating Americans and South Vietnamese. 0 His
reference to "restrictions" was undoubtedly to the statutory
funding prohibitions, 37 rather than to the War Powers Resolution, for the latter imposed no restrictions upon the introduction
limit 38 was unlikely
of armed forces into hostilities and its 60-day
39
effort.
evacuation
an
by
to be exceeded
31. Communication from Gerald R. Ford to James Eastland, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Apr. 4, 1975, in 121 CONG. REc. 5280
(daily ed. Apr. 7, 1975).
32. XXXIII CONG. Q. WEKLY REPORT 687 (1975).
33. Id.
34. Communication from Gerald R. Ford to James Eastland, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Apr. 4, 1975, in 121 CONG. REC. 5280
(daily ed. Apr. 7, 1975).
35. Id. If the President was correct that the action he had taken
did not amount to an introduction of armed forces into a situation
"where imminent involvement in hostilities was clearly indicated by
the circumstances," Resolution § 4(a) (1), then the report was properly
submitted under section 4(a) (2) and did not trigger the 60-day limit
imposed by section 5 (b) upon section 4(a) (1) involvements.
36. XXXIII CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPoirT 730 (1975).
37. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
38. Resolution § 5(b).
39. Although the President requested only "clarification," his
speech also contained a cryptic reference to "authority":
And now I ask Congress to clarify immediately its restrictions on the use of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for
the limited purposes of protecting American lives by ensuring
their evacuation, if this should become necessary. I also ask
prompt revision of the law to cover those Vietnamese to whom
we have a very special obligation and whose lives may be endangered, should the worst come to pass.
I hope that this authority will never be used, but if it is
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The second report was submitted two days later.40 The
President, "taking note of section 4 of the War Powers Resolution," reported that Khmer Rouge forces had reached the outskirts of Phnom Penh and were within mortar range of Pochentong Airfield, and that he had therefore "ordered U.S. military
forces to proceed with the planned evacuation." These forces
included 350 marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting tactical
aircraft. A total of 82 United States citizens, 159 Cambodians,
and 35 third-country nationals were evacuated during the fourhour operation. Although hostile recoilless rifle fire was encountered by the last forces to leave, the fire was not returned. No
41
casualties were incurred.
On April 14, Senate Majority Whip Robert Byrd responded
to the President's request for "clarification" of the statutory
funding prohibitions by introducing legislation 42 to authorize
needed there will be no time for Congressional debate.
CONG. Q. WEEKy REPORT 730 (1975) (emphasis added).
The significance of this reference was apparently made clear, however, to at least some members of the House during the ensuing consideration of the President's request. Representative Stephen Solarz,
questioning State Department Legal Advisor Monroe Leigh concerning
Mr. Leigh's assertion that "clarification" had not been needed to evacuate American citizens because the President had constitutional authority
to do so regardless of the funding prohibitions, stated:
Based on your testimony, I gather you were suggesting that this
[clarification] was requested largely for political rather than
constitutional purposes because the President wanted, I gather,
broad-based constitutional [sic? political?] support for the action
he was taking. Yet, if in fact, that was the underlying rationale
for the request, I must tell you that as one member of the International Relations Committee I feel that I was misled because
during the course of the testimony and debates before our
committee and during the course of the debates on the floor
of the House, the argument was made not simply that the
President wanted political legitimation of his efforts but rather
that this authority was specifically needed.
Hearings,supra note 20, at 25.
40. Communication from Gerald R. Ford to the Speaker of the
House and to the President of the Senate, Apr. 12, 1975, in 11 WEEKLY
CO1IrpIAION or PRESIDENTIAL DocuImENTs 378 (1975).
41. Id. The only provision of the Resolution specifically menXXXHI

tioned in the report was section 4. Compare text accompanying note 34

supra. In this case the President's apparent conclusion that "imnminent
involvement in hostilities" had not occurred is highly dubious, as even
the administration's definition of that phrase indicates:
As applied in the first three war powers reports, "hostilities"

was used to mean a situation in which units of the U.S. armed
forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing
units of hostile forces, and "imminent hostilities" was considered
to mean a situation in which there is a serious risk from hostile
fire to the safety of United States Forces.
Hearings,supra note 20, at 38-39.
42. S.J. Res. 72, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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the use of the armed forces to protect United States citizens being
evacuated from South Vietnam under circumstances posing a

threat to their lives.43 The bill would have removed the statutory funding prohibitions "to the extent necessary to give effect
44
to" that authorization.
On approximately the same date, the administration transmitted to Congress its own bill for "clarification" of the funding
prohibitions. It provided simply that nothing contained in those
prohibitions "shall be construed as limiting the availability of
funds for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States to
aid, assist, and carry out humanitarian evacuation, if ordered by
the President.145 Unlike Senator Byrd's bill 40 and the Senate
version of the War Powers Resolution, 47 it contained no authorization for the use of the armed forces and no limitations upon
48
what persons could be evacuated or under what circumstances.
On Aprl 17, the House International Relations Committee
reported a bill essentially similar to the administration's
model.4 9 It did not purport to confer authority to use the armed
forces. 50 Rather, it authorized funds for the evacuation, 5 '
"without the use of military force, if possible," of citizens and
dependents of citizens or permanent residents of the United
States; of "Vietnamese nationals eligible for immigration to the
United States by reason of their relationships to American citizens"; and of other foreign nationals under "direct and imminent
threat" of death, if the armed forces "necessary to carry out their
evacuation do not exceed those necessary to carry out the evacuation of" the prior two categories of persons.5 2
43. Id. § 2 (c). This provision was virtually identical to § 3 (3) of S.
440, the Senate version of the War Powers Resolution. See note 13 supra.
44. S.J. Res. 72, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (c) (1975).
45. H.R. Doc. No. 103, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
46. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
47. See note 13 supra.
48. Senator Frank Church, a memboer of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, described the admini:stration's proposal as being "as
broad as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution." XXXIII CoNG. Q. WEEKLY
REPORT 777 (1975).
49. H.R. 6096, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
50. An amendment added on the House floor purported to limit
"the authority granted by this section," id. § 4, but section 4 contained
no authority; it merely defined the word "evacuation" for the purposes
of section 2, which authorized appropriations.
51. Id. § 2. The bill did not prohibit the use of funds authorized
under other acts for the purpose of carrying out the evacuation of the
designated persons. Funds authorized elsewhere were in fact used.
52. Id. § 4.
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The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, meeting the week
of April 14-18, was thus confronted with three alternatives: do
nothing5 3 report a measure setting aside the funding prohibitions and suggesting that the President proceed on the basis of
his own constitutional authority; or follow Senator Byrd's
leadG4 and report a measure authorizing use of the armed forces
to evacuate certain persons in certain circumstances and lifting
the funding prohibitions to the extent necessary to implement
that authorization. The Committee selected the final alternative..
The Committee had already drafted a blueprint for implementing this choice. Six years earlier, in reporting the National
Commitments Resolution, it had recommended that
in considering future resolutions involving the use or possible
use of Armed Forces, Congress(1) Debate the proposed resolution at sufficient length to
establish a legislative record showing the intent of Congress;
(2) Use the words authorize or empower or such other
language as will leave no doubt that Congress alone has the
right to authorize the initiation of war and that, in granting the
President authority to use the armed forces, Congress is granting him power that he would not otherwise have;
(3) State in the resolution as explicitly as possible under
the circumstances the kind of military action that is being
authorized and the place and purpose of its use; and
(4) Put a time limit on the resolution, thereby assuring
Congress the opportunity to review its decision and extend or
terminate the President's authority to use military force.55
The Vietnam Contingency Act of 1975,56 reported April
18, comported with these guidelines. It authorized use of the
armed forces "in a number and manner essential to and directly
connected with the protection of . . . United States citizens and
their dependents while they are being withdrawn" from South
Vietnam. 57 It required the President, upon any such use of
the forces, to submit a report under section 4(a) of the War
Powers Resolution and to certify that a direct and imminent
threat existed to the lives of such citizens, that every effort had
been made to terminate that threat diplomatically, and that the
53. This approach was favored by Senator Joseph Biden, who
recommended that the Senate "[c]all to the attention of the President that he already has the authority to evacuate endangered Americans and their dependents from South Vietnam." S. REP. No. 88, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1975).
54. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
55. S. REP. No. 129, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1969).
56. S. 1484, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
57. Id. § 3(a).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1

evacuation was being carried out as rapidly as possible.5 8 The
bill also authorized the use of the armed forces "to assist in bringing out endangered foreign nationals," but only if that could be
done incidentally to, and without any expansion of, the evacuation of United States citizens and their dependents. 59 Lastly,
the bill set aside the statutory funding prohibitions "only to the
extent necessary to give effect to" authorization for the evacuation of United States citizens and their dependents.60
The Senate passed the bill in substantially the same form
in which it had been reported, with the result that the conference
committee was confronted with the same alternatives that the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee had faced. Like the Senate
Committee, the conference committee chose the route of authorizing and limiting use of the armed forces, and adopted the
Senate language virtually without change in its report. 1
Adoption of the conference report would have been an
important reassertion of the congressional war-making power,
reclamation of which had begun with the enactment of the
various funding prohibitions and the War Powers Resolution. A
specifically limited congressional authorization would have prevented the evacuation from serving as a precedent for independent presidential use of the armed forces to rescue endangered
United States citizens, or any other persons, when there is time
to seek the permission of Congress.6 2 Indeed, it would have
established a precedent for requiring congressional authorization.
Such a precedent would have been most clearly justified insofar
as it related to rescue of foreign nationals, for there the constitutional support for the President's independent action is particularly slim. 3

Perhaps even more importantly, enactment of the conference
report would have avoided the erosion of the congressional power
over the purse that was bound to occur if the President was permitted to proceed with the planned evacuation in the face of
statutory prohibitions on the use of funds for that purpose. 4
58. Id. §§ 3(b), (c).
59. Id. § 4.
60. Id. § 6.
61. See H.R. REP. No. 176, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
62. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
63. Id.
64. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. In the past, Presidents have occasionally withdrawn funds from the Treasury without
congressional approval. See generally L. WMERDING, Tan SPENDING
PowER (1943). Most of these incidents occurred in the last century
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In particular, it would have undermined any claim by the executive branch that funding prohibitions could not curtail activities
allegedly supported by the commander-in-chief clause.6 5
The conference report was passed by the Senate on April
25, the same day it was filed by the conferees. It was scheduled
for consideration by the House the morning of April 29. However, that morning Speaker Carl Albert telephoned from the
White House to remove the bill from the calendar. 66 The evac(when congressional sessions were shorter and transportation slower),
while Congress was adjourned and unable to appropriate funds. In
some cases Congress later ratified the President's action. In any event,
it appears that no previous President expended funds in contravention
of an express statutory prohibition.
65. Predictably, such claims were in fact made. See Hearings,
supra note 20, at 34-35, 88; note 103 infra and accompanying text.
66. See 121 CONG. REC. 3401-02 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1975). The
reasons for the Speaker's action were not clear. Apparently Mr. Albert
and other Representatives thought that section 4 of the conference report, H.R. REP. No. 176, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1975) (corresponding
to section 3 of the Senate's Vietnam Contingency Act, see notes 57-58
supra and accompanying text), provided potential statutory support for

reintroduction of United States forces into South Vietnam:
Ms. ABzuG. I am glad to see that at this time we are not
forced to give the President authority which he could use to
justify armed intervention here in Vietnam or in other conflict
situations. I believe that removing the rule from the floor of
the House this morning for the consideration of the conference
report was a wise act.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr.Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Ms. ABzuG. I am happy to yield to our Speaker, the gentle-

man from Oklahoma (Mr. ALBERT).

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I have just returned from the
White House, where it was agreed there by the President that
we would take this whole matter off for today because the
section 4 part, which was the controversial part, may be moot
before the day is over. If so, when we consider the bill, the
parliamentary situation may permit removal of that part from
the final version.
Ms. ABzuG.
I thank the Speaker. I requested that the
Chairman of the Rules Committee and the Chairman of the
International Relations Committee not to call up the rule of the
report today, because I too believe it to be moot.
Id. at 3405-06.
Those who understood the issues were less pleased. Representative
Thomas Morgan, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, was later reported to be "extremely angry" with Majority Leader
Thomas P. O'Neill for the latter's opposition to the conference report.
N.Y. Times, May 2, 1975, at 1, col. 1. Representative Clement Zablocki,
chief sponsor of the War Powers Resolution in the House, responded to
Ms. Abzug and Mr. Albert as follows:
Mr. ZABLOCKL

Mr. Speaker, I sincerely hope that as ex-

peditiously as possible and as soon as possible we do act on the
conference report. I submit that it is necessary ....
Of course, the President would want us to strike section 4.
That section clarifies the relationship of the evacuation with
regard to the war powers resolution and sets a good precedent
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uation was already in progress. Later that day, President Duong
Van Minh in Saigon announced the unconditional surrender of
67
South Vietnam.
On April 30, the President transmitted a report regarding
the evacuation.6 8 Again "taking note of the provision of section
4 of the War Powers Resolution," he reported that the operation
involved 70 helicopters, fighter aircraft, and 865 marines. The
fighters "suppressed" anti-aircraft fire, and ground forces occasionally returned enemy fire. Four members of the armed forces
were killed, including two marines "on regular duty" at Tan Son
Nhut Airfield. Approximately 19 hours elapsed from the time
United States forces entered South Vietnamese airspace until the
last elements of the ground security forces departed Saigon.
On May 1, the House took up the conference report and
rejected it, 162-246.69

B. THE Mayaguez rNciDENT
Early in the morning hours70 of Monday, May 12, 1975, the
Mayaguez, a merchant vessel of United States registry with a
crew of United States citizens, was seized by a Cambodian motor
torpedo boat six and one-half miles southeast of Poulo Wai
Island and taken to Kho Tang Island. That afternoon, 1100
marines were ordered flown from Okinawa and the Phillipines
to Utapao Air Base in Thailand. This time the President did
not request Congress to "clarify" the statutory funding prohibitions. At 1:00 a.m. Wednesday, May 14, United States aircraft
sank a Cambodian patrol craft that had attempted to leave Kho
Tang Island. Thereafter two other Cambodian patrol craft were
destroyed and four immobilized. Several hours later the Mayaof congressional action pursant to that resolution. It is understandable why the President would not want us to insist on
retaining that section.
121 CONG. REc. 3406 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1975). Speaking in the Senate
the next day, Senator Javits termed the failure of the House to deal
with the conference report "very unfortunate." Id. at 7114 (daily ed.
Apr. 30, 1975).
67. XXXIII CNG Q. WEEKLY REPORT 907 (1975).
B8. Communication from Gerald R. Ford to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, Apr. 30, 1975, in 121 CONG. REC. 3592 (daily
ed. May 1, 1975).
69. 121 CONG. REc. 3551 (daily ed. May 1, 1975).
70. Eastern Daylight Time, here and in remainder of paragraph.
Unless otherwise indicated, the description of events in this paragraph is
based on the memorandum, Congressional Research Service, U.S.
Library of Congress, A Chronolgy of Events in the Mayaguez Incident,
May 30, 1975, reprintedin Hearings,supra note 20, app., at 105.

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
guez crew members were put in a fishing vessel and taken to
Kompong Som. on the Cambodian mainland. At 7:00 p.m. Phnom
Penh radio was overheard in Bangkok announcing that the Cambodian government would release the Mayaguez. Afterwards,
at 7:20 p.m., about 135 marines landed on Koh Tang Island under
heavy fire. At 9:00 p.m. marines, boarding from the U.S.S. Holt,
took possession of the Mayaguez. At 10:45 p.m. the destroyer
U.S.S. Wilson reported a small boat approaching, flying a white
flag; at 10:53 p.m. the Wilson sent word to the Pentagon that
at least 30 caucasians were aboard the boat. (After the incident,
Secretary Schlesinger stated that the crewmen "arrived at the
Wilson as a result of what is presumed to be the decision of the
Cambodians to deliver them up in order to terminate combat
activities directed primarily at the mainland." 71) At 11:00 p.m.
United States aircraft struck the airfield at Ream and an oil
storage depot on the Cambodian mainland. 72 The Pentagon
said that 17 enemy planes had been destroyed on the ground,
a hangar smashed, and the runways cratered. 73 By the conclusion of hostilities 41 members of the United States armed forces
had been killed.7 4 The 39 members of the crew survived unharmed.
The President's report was submitted May 15.75 Although
"taking note of Section 4(a) (1) of the War Powers Resolution,"
it ignored Section 4 (a) (3) in neglecting to mention the enlargement of United States forces in Thailand. Nor did it report any
fatalities or refer to the statutory funding prohibitions.

C. FAnLuRE OF THE FUNDING PROHIBITIONS
The statements of facts contained in the four reports
submitted by the President under section 4 of the War Powers
Resolution7 6 leave little doubt that in each case United States
forces carried out "military operations" or "combat activities"
"in," "over," or "off the shores of" Cambodia or South Vietnam,77 and thus that in each case the several statutory funding
71. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 14, cols. 2-3.
72. Id. May 20, 1975, at 14, col. 5.
73. Id. May 16, 1975, at 14, col. 2.
74. Telephone conversation with Congressional Research Service,
U.S. Library of Congress, Sept. 5, 1975.
75. Communication from Gerald R. Ford to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate,
May 15, 1975, in 11 WEEKLY COMPIATON OF PRESIDENTIaL DOCUMENTS

514 (1975).
76. See text accompanying notes 35, 41, 68, and 75 supra.
77. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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prohibitions were violated. Indeed, in the case of the Mayaguez
incident this conclusion is implicitly acknowledged by the report's reference to section 4(a) (1) of the War Powers Resolution-the section dealing with situations wherein forces are
"introduced into hostilities."
Nevertheless, on May 7, just prior to the Mayaguez incident,
Monroe Leigh expressed to a subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee the view that the statutory funding
prohibitions did not apply to the evacuations because "there was
...a very substantial legislative history that it was not the
intent of Congress in the funds limitation statutes to curtail...
[the] exercise of presidential authority [to evacuate Americans] ."78

Is Mr. Leigh not familiar with the "plain meaning rule"?7 9
Moreover, if the statutes were not applicable, 0 why did President Ford request, prior to the Vietnam evacuation, that they
In any event, the legislative
be "clarified immediately"? 8s
82
history provides almost no support for Mr. Leigh's theory.
78. Hearings, supra note 20, at 16-17. At the June 4 session of
the hearings Mr. Leigh extended his opinion to the Mayaguez incident.
Id. at 88-89.

In addition, Mr. Leigh questioned the constitutional authority of the
Congress to circumscribe by means of! funding prohibitions the President's supposed authority as commander in chief to order such operations as the evacuations and the rescue of the Mayaguez crew. See text
accompanying notes 103-16 infra.
79. "One of the most common of insights about the process of
communication," says Sutherland, "was given classic expression by the
Supreme Court ... in the declaration that 'the meaning of the statute
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act
is framed, and if that is plain, . .. the sole function of the courts is
to enforce it according to its terms.' [Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470 (1917).]" 2a C. SANDS, STATuTms Am STATUTORY CoNsTRucTIoN
§ 46.01 (4th ed. 1973).
Expressing that insight from the layman's viewpoint, Representative Stephen Solarz remarked, in conmenting on Mr. Leigh's theory,
that "one of the disadvantages of not being a lawyer [is that] you
" Heartend to think language means what it appears to mean ....
ings, supra note 20, at 28.
80. Or if the statutes were unconstitutional, as Mr. Leigh also
suggested. See notes 103-16 infra and accompanying text.
81. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. Mr. Leigh's answer
is that "the President thought he had adequate constitutional power
despite the funds limitation provisions to take out Americans ....,"
Hearings, supra note 20, at 26, but not to take out foreign nationals.
Id. at 25. If this was the President's thought, he certainly did not
reveal it in his request that Congress "clarify" the funding prohibitions.
Clarification was sought for evacuation of Americans as well as South
Vietnamese. See XXXIII CONG. Q. W.mny REPORT 730 (1975); note 39
supra and accompanying text.
82. Mr. Leigh has offered only two items in support of his refer-
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Only one reasonable inference can be drawn from Mr. Leigh's
ex post facto claim of executive authority. The failure of Congress to pass the Vietnam Contingency Act and to object to
the violation of the funding prohibitions during the evacuations
had convinced the administration by the time of the Mayaguez
incident that most members of Congress would not object to a
further violation of the funding prohibitions if the activities constituting the violation were politically acceptable.8 3 The law had
become a mere inconvenience which-thanks to public support,
the legal theories of the State Department, and the acquiescence
of Congress-could be ignored.
III. NEED FOR STRENGTHENING THE WAR
POWERS RESOLUTION
A.

PRIOR R~sTTAiNTs

Clearly the parade of horribles predicted by President
ence, see note 78 supra and accompanying text, to a "very substantial"
legislative history indicating the inapplicability of the funding prohibitions to the evacuations and the Mayaguez incident. See Hearings,supra
note 20, at 27, 31. Each item relates to only one of the several prohibitions. One is a statement by Congressman Joseph Addabbo that
seems to imply that the prohibition in question, Joint Resolution of
July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 134, was not intended to
prohibit the President from exercising any of his commander-in-chief
powers. 119 CoNG. REc. 21,313 (1973). There is no evidence that other
members of Congress shared Mr. Addabbo's view. Representative
Jonathan Bingham, for one, disagreed. Responding to Mr. Leigh's interpretation of the legislative history, he said:
Well, I would suggest to you that those provisions were put into
the law to curtail what President Nixon at the time said was
his authority as Commander in Chief to protect and safeguard
the evacuation of American troops which was the reason he
gave, for example, for going into Cambodia. If your interpretation is correct, then that statutory limitation had no effect.
Hearings, supra note 20, at 17.
The other item is an exchange of remarks that Mr. Leigh claims
occurred during testimony given "in executive session .

..

before the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee" on August 3, 1973 by Admiral
Moorer, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Id. at 31. In fact,
the Admiral did not testify before the Committee on that date. He did
meet unofficially with congressional leaders at that time, but the
transcript of that proceeding remained classified as of September 15,
1975. Thus the remarks, whatever their content, were heard by no
more than a handful of the members of Congress who voted on the
funding prohibition in question and are not part of its legislative
history.
83. The apex of congressional legal acuity during the Mayaguez
incident was reached by Senator Henry Jackson, who revealed on NBC's
"Today" program of May 15 that the War Powers Resolution had "superseded" the statutory funding prohibitions. Four such prohibitions were
enacted after passage of the Resolution.
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Nixon 4 has not been set to march by enactment of the War
Powers Resolution. The evacuations and the Mayaguez incident
demonstrate that the Resolution has not diminished the ability
of the President to "act decisively and convincingly"-even in
the face of statutory funding prohibitions.8 5
On the contrary, events during the spring of 1975 illustrate
that the Resolution presents no bar to possible excesses of presidential war-making. The ratio of United States citizens evacuated to foreign nationals evacuated from Cambodia and Vietnam
strongly suggests that, but for the dubiously constitutional
evacuation of the latter,"6 the exposure of United States forces
to hostilities would have been considerably shortened and possibly eliminated.8 7 And during the Mayaguez incident, both the
assault on Koh Tang Island after the Cambodian government
had announced it would release the vessel and the attacks on
the Cambodian mainland after the release of the Mayaguez crew
were apparently retaliatory8 8 and thus also unconstitutional.8 9
84. See note 3 supra.
85. It appears that the primary burden imposed upon the President by the Resolution has been the interruption of his sleep to sign his
name to a report. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 77 (testimony of
Mr. Leigh).
86. See note 23 supra. Even Mr. Leigh declined to assert a presidential prerogative to evacuate foreign nationals without congressional
authorization. See Hearings,supra note 20, at 34-35, 88.
87. A total of 82 United States citizens and 194 foreign nationals
were evacuated during the four-hour operation in Phnom Penh. See
Communication from Gerald R. Ford to the Speaker of the House and
to the President of the Senate, Apr. 12, 1975, in 11 WEEKLY COmPLATION
OF P

IESmm-1LqA

DocUmENTs

378 (1975).

In the final removal from

Saigon, about 1000 United States citizens and 5500 South Vietnamese
were evacuated. Four marines were killed in the final withdrawal.
XXXI CONGRESSIONAL Q. WEEKLY REPORT 907 (1975).
88. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra. The New York Times
reported that the administration's rationale for the strikes on the mainland was
to keep Cambodian forces from reinforcing the defenders of
Tang Island.
But, judging by the Government's own reports, the Cambodians had no ships and planes that could not have been interdicted by the warships and aircraft that the United States had
on the scene.
Schabecoff, Questions on Ship Rescue Persist Despite Briefings, N.Y.
Times, May 20, 1975, at 1, col. 2, at 14, col. 5.
Senator Javits made the following observation concerning the
incident:
Facts which were not revealed to the Congress in the unsatisfactory consultation process concerning the Mayaguez, but which
have subsequently come to light, raise profound questions concerning the military actions taken in connection with securing
release of the ship and the crew. For instance, we have learned
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The validity of certain criticism of the Resolution has been
vindicated; namely, lacking prior restraints it does not curb
unwanted presidential uses of the armed forces. Major military
operations can, in modern times, take far less than even 48 hours,
let alone 60 or 90 days. The evacuations from Cambodia and
Vietnam were completed before the reports required by the
Resolution were submitted. Neither during those instances, nor
during the Mayaguez incident, did the Resolution pose any obstacle to real or potential transgressions of the constitutional
limits of the President's war-making power.
B. SUBSEQUENT LumITATIONS
The effectiveness of the subsequent limitations of the
Resolution 0 as a deterrent to congressionally unauthorized use
of military force by the President has not yet been tested, but
the administration has suggested that it may ignore the subsequent limitations should the question arise. Mr. Leigh indicated,
in testifying before the Subcommittee on National Security
Policy and Scientific Developments of the House International
Relations Committee, that if a President's use of the armed forces
is pursuant to a constitutional grant of power-and what Presithat the amphibious assault by our Marines was conducted
against the wrong island, 20 minutes after the crew had been
released. The lives of 41 U.S. servicemen were lost in connection with the release of 39 crew members. Bombing missions
were conducted against an oil refinery and aircraft on the
Cambodian mainland both known to our government to be nonoperational. In addition, it appears that the standard warning
being given to all ships of the risk of being stopped in those
waters was not given to the Mayaguez.
Hearings,supra note 20, at 68 (emphasis added).
The President reportedly rejected the advice of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that he employ only the minimum amount of force requiredthe "rule of proportionality"-and instead employed a higher degree
than was actually necessary, opting for "equivalence plus." Evans &
Novak, Retrieving the Mayaguez: 'It Was Pure Ford,' Washington Post,
May 19, 1975, § A, at 23, col. 1.
89. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text. The President's
use of armed force to rescue (without retaliation) captive United States
citizens would seem to stand on approximately the same constitutional
footing as his use of armed force to evacuate imninently endangered
United States citizens from foreign territory. Id. As in the case of
evacuations, independent presidential rescue actions will have greater
constitutional support where inspired by emergencies necessitating
action more rapid than Congress can provide, id., and where tacitly
approved, or at least not formally opposed, by Congress. See note 29
supra. As the danger of large-scale or protracted hostilities increases,
however, the President's independent authority becomes doubtful. See
notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
90. Resolution §§ 5(b), (c).
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dent will claim otherwise?-then any statutory provision (such
as the 60-day limit of section 5 (b) ), to say nothing of a mere
concurrent resolution (such as !hat provided for by section
5 (c) ),91 purporting to cut short that use is unconstitutional. 2
91. A concurrent resolution requires approval by a majority of
both houses, but because it is not signed by the President or subject to
his veto, is without the force and effect of law. A joint resolution, on
the other hand, is signed by the President and has the force and effect
of law.
It is curious that proponents of a broad presidential war-making
power argue that "adaptation by usage" has legitimized otherwise unconstitutional presidential activities, see note 26 supra and accompanying text, and yet refuse to apply the same principle to use of the
"legislative veto"-a statutory provision authorizing Congress, by concurrent resolution (or one house, by simple resolution, or in some cases
a congressional committee), to prevent a particular presidential action,
otherwise permitted by the statute, from taking effect. The practice is
well established. For a discussion of various laws employing the
legislative veto, see Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of
Congress, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto Amendment to the
Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act, Sept. 4, 1973, reprinted in
120 CONG. REc. 9855 (daily ed. June 6, 1974); Note, Congressional Adaptation: The Come-into-Agreement Provision, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
387 (1968); Large, New Veto Powers for Congress, Wall Street Journal,
Feb. 6, 1975, at 14, col. 4.
92. Mr. Leigh testified as follows:
I think it would be unconstitutional on the simple logic that if
the President had the power to put the men there in the first
place that power could not be taken away by concurrent resolution because the power is constitutional in nature. There might,
however, be all sorts of reasons as to why the political process
would force him to wish to comply with that concurrent resolution.
Hearings, supra note 20, at 91. Representative Zablocki responded that
"our statutes are replete with cases where Congress has given temporary authority to the President ....

But what Congress gives in this

way it can also take back-by concurrent resolution."

Id. at 94. To

this Mr. Leigh replied,

[the Resolution] does not delegate anything to the President. It is not an act of delegation by the Congress of power
to the President. It is, as Senator Javits was saying, a procedural scheme for arranging an interchange in what is obviously a difficult area between the two branches of the Government ....

Therefore, the argument that this is like some of the
earlier examples where Congress created a concurrent resolution procedure to control the exercise of authority delegated to
the President-namely, the Legislative Reorganization Acts
where Congress did delegate certain legislative powers-is
arguable [sic? inapposite?] ....

Therefore, to say that Congress would later by concurrent
resolution take back what it had previously delegated overlooks
the fact that nothing was delegated.
Id. at 96-97.
These arguments were also raised by opponents of the Resolution
at the time of its enactment. See note 15 supra. They overlook the
fact that any congressionally unauthorized "introduction" of the armed
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It is worth noting, in this connection, the wording of the four
reports submitted by President Ford. They were not submitted
"in accordance with" or "pursuant to" or "as required by" section
4(a) of the War Powers Resolution; the President simply "took
note of" the reporting requirement. 9 3 Moreover, the reports submitted during the evacuations from Cambodia and Vietnam were
not identified as "paragraph (1)" reports,94 the only type that
triggers the 60-day limit. Whether this represented an attempt
to evade the law is unclear; however, also worth noting is an
executive-branch objection to various provisions of the Vietnam
Contingency Act 95 on the ground that they would "require the
President to endorse the provisions of the War Powers Resolution."90 In the light of these unsubtle warnings that the present
administration, like the last,97 considers the Resolution uncon-

stitutional, it takes little prescience to realize that the day may
come when a President chooses not to "take note of" the reporting requirement or any other provision of the Resolution.
And he may succeed in doing so, for the share of the warmaking powers exercised by each branch is and has been less
a function of the textual allotment of that power by the Constitution than of the political ability of Congress or the President
to claim and exercise that power. The ability of Congress to
exact future compliance with section 5 (b) and 5 (c) of the Resolution, if and when the occasion to do so arises, may thus rest more
on the political leverage it can exercise than on the force of its
legal arguments. The Mayaguez incident would certainly suggest as much. A clearer case of presidential violation of statutory law 8 could hardly exist. But the President's actions were
forces that fits the description of Section 4(a) (1) of the Resolution
will be constitutionally justified only in relation to the emergency
nature of the circumstances supposedly necessitating the introduction.
See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text. The theory is that an
emergency justifies independent presidential action if Congress cannot
act effectively in the available time. Once Congress acts to prevent or to
terminate such an action, the emergency is over for constitutional
purposes. (A preexisting statutory funding prohibition constitutes such
a preventive measure, of course, because it indicates a congressional
intent that no set of circumstances shall justify independent presidential
action.)
93. See text accompanying notes 34, 41, 68, and 75 supra.
94. See note 41 supra.
95. S. 1484, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
96. Comment from the executive branch submitted to Senate For-

eign Relations Committee, April 22, 1975.
97. See note 3 supra.
98. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
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popular, as they normally are in such circumstances, 99 and compliance with the funding prohibitions was not politically necessary. The determinative factors in a President's decision to
comply or not to comply with section 5 of the War Powers
Resolution may likewise be primarily political rather than legal
in nature.
Consequently, it is possible that an effort to bolster the
Resolution will be successful only to the extent that legal logic is
an ingredient of political power. But insofar as the logic of the
law is all Congress can ever with certainty rely on, Congress
should ensure now that the fullest reasure of its authority under
the Constitution is brought to bear behind section 5.
IV. METHODS OF STRENGTHENING THE RESOLUTION

A. USE OF THE APPROPRIATIONS POWER TO LIMIT MI ITARY
AcTiTviEs
One exclusively congressional power-perhaps the most
important of congressional powers-is the power over the
purse.' 0 0 What is the status of that power? Clearly, congressional acquiescence in its usurpation during the evacuations
from Vietnam and Cambodia and the Mayaguez incident did not
99. Presidential popularity has almost invariably increased during
international crises-even embarrassing ones-as polls indicate:
"Do you appr ove
of the way the
Presider t is
his
handling )b?"
ic

Date
June 1950
July 1950 __
August 1956

Time
Before Korean outbreak

After U.S. entry

Yes (perce nt)

Before Israeli, British, French
Attack on Suez _
After U.S. opposition to the attack
December 1956
Before Lebanon
July 1958
After U.S. marine landing
August 1958
Before U-2 incident
May 1960
U-2 debacle; collapse of Summit
June 1960
Before Bay of Pigs
March 1961
April 1961
After Bay of Pigs
Eve of Cuba crisis
October 1962 __
December 1962 -_ After missile crisis
Before tour of Pacific
October 1966 November 1966 - After tour of Pacific
Before Glassboro conference
June 1967
After Glassboro conference
June 1967 __
T. Lowi, THE END Or LIBERALIsM 184 (1969).

100. U.S.

-

CONST.

art. I, § 9, cl. 7.

37
46
67
75
52
58
62
68
73
83
61
74
44
48
44
52
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redound to congressional benefit. Those events could conceivably be cited by future Presidents as precedents for military
operations for which Congress has denied funds.
The Legal Advisor of the Department of State, in fact, has
already entered a two-pronged challenge to the power of Congress to employ funding limitations to restrict presidential military activities. He contends that funding prohibitions are unconstitutional to the extent that they prohibit the exercise of
authority granted by the commander-in-chief clause and, in any
event, constitutionally ineffective to limit such authority as long
as funds are elsewhere available. Each proposition warrants
examination.
1. GeneralConstitutionality
As previously noted,10 1 Mr. Leigh has indicated that he
believes that the President possessed the authority to evacuate
United States citizens from Cambodia and South Vietnam and
to rescue the Mayaguez crew, notwithstanding prohibitions
against the use of funds for those activities. Although he asserted that the prohibitions were inapplicable because of their
legislative history, 10 2 he also indicated that had they been
applicable, he would have considered them unconstitutional:
I do believe personally that such matters [as the Cambodia
and Vietnam evacuations] involve the inherent constitutional
power of the President and I don't think that every limitation
that Congress might enact on an appropriation or otherwise is

necessarily a constitutional one. 0I3 think there are some that
would be plainly unconstitutional.

Which appropriations limitations would be "plainly unconstitutional"? The Constitution provides that "No Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."'104 The Supreme Court has never held
unconstitutional any use of the appropriations power to limit the
exercise of power by the executive branch. 0 5 The only limita101. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.

102. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
103. Hearings, supra note 20, at 35. Mr. Leigh's argument in this
context is basically the same, of course, as is his contention that the
subsequent limitation contained in sections 5 (b) and (c)of the War
Powers Resolution are unconstitutional insofar as they purport to
terminate presidential exercise of a power constitutionally his. See
notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
104. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
105.

THE

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
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tion on an appropriation act that the Court has invalidated 0 6
exceeded a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress10 7
the prohibition against bills of attainder.
The only prohibitions in the Constitution against the use of
the appropriations power to curtail the activities of another
branch are the requirements that the Justices of the Supreme
Court and the President receive a compensation that may not
be diminished. 0 8 Had the Framers intended further limitations on the appropriations power they surely would have included them. Indeed, in the case of military matters they went
to the other extreme. In addition to the power to appropriate
funds-and to refuse to do so-they gave Congress the power
to "raise and support Armies" 10 9 and to "provide and maintain
a Navy""°0-and to refuse to do so. Far from giving the President power over the purse so that he could carry out the commander-in-chief clause, as Mr. Leigh suggests, the Framers
believed it "particularly dangerous to give the keys of the trea111
sury, and the command of the army, into the same hands."
As a result, they transferred the war power, in the words of
Jefferson, "from the Executive to the Legislative body, from
those who are to spend to those who are to pay.""12 Thus
Presidents Jefferson and Jackson, when requesting congressional
instructions as to the proper course to pursue in the fact of threatened aggression by Spain and marauding by South American
pirates, respectively, recognized that control of the "means"
necessary to carry out any military effort lies exclusively with
Congress. 118 The supremacy of the purse power was recognized
by the Nixon administration even as it asserted broad power
under the commander-in-chief clause to prosecute the war in
Vietnam. 114
INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1597-1619

(1973)

(setting forth a summary of all acts of Congress held unconstitutional
in whole or in part).
106. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
107. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3.
108. Id. art II, § 1, cl. 6; Id. art. III, § 1.
109. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
110. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
111.
112.

Tim FEDERALIST No. 38, at 247 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
15 THE PAPERS OF THOmAS JEFFERSON 397 (J.Boyd ed. 1958).

113. See note 24 supra.
114. The following exchange took place between Senator Frank
Church and Secretary of State William Rogers when the latter testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 14, 1971:
Senator CmnRcH. If the Congress were to decide to limit
the funds for the purpose of effecting a withdrawal of our forces
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2. "Conditions Subsequent"?
The second basis for Mr. Leigh's denial that Congress may
constitutionally employ funding prohibitions to restrict the President in what he believes to be a constitutional use of armed
force is his unexplained theory that such prohibitions are "conditions subsequent." In order to cut off funds for a specific
activity, Mr. Leigh argues, Congress must wait for the President
to "use up all the moneys appropriated."11 5
Precisely what type of appropriation Mr. Leigh meant by
"all the moneys appropriated" is not clear. Whether he meant
the entire defense budget, something less, or something more,
must be guessed, but is not important, for Mr. Leigh's point is
clear. The President can use for one purpose funds that were
designated for another until those funds are exhausted, notwithstanding a law prohibiting that use.
This is nonsense. Followed to its logical conclusion, Mr.
Leigh's argument would deprive Congress of the power to specify
from Indochina and such defensive action as may be needed to
protect them against imminent danger in the event that became
necessary, as they withdrew do you think that that falls within
the constitutional power of tie Congress to determine how public
money is spent, or do you think that that would be an interference with the President's inherent powers as Commander
in Chief?
Secretary Roams. Here again, I would want to see the language, of course, but I fully recognize the power of the Congress
to appropriate funds, and we do respect the wishes of Congress.

For example, Congress included some restrictions on the use of

ground troops in that area, and we have observed those restrictions. So we are not at odds with the Congress.
War Powers Legislation,supra note 21, at 508.

115. Mr. Sotamnz. Do you believe that in a situation where the
President would commit American troops into combat pursuant

to what he believed was his inherent constitutional authority
that the Congress, if it determined that it did not want the troops
there-would the Congress have the authority, in your judgment, to pass a law cutting off funding for the troops and thereby in effect requiring the President to withdraw them?
Mr. LEIGH. Again, I make the distinction as between the
condition subsequent in an appropriation not yet completely
spent and new appropriations.
Mr. SoLAmZ. I have to confess that without a legal backgroundMr. LEIGH. If he has used up all the money appropriated
and then Congress refuses to provide any more, I think the
Congress has effectively stopped the President from continuing
the military action. I don't know how he can go on. If, on
the other hand, he still had moneys that were unexpended, he

could continue to spend those until such time as there was a

court challenge and the court found that he was acting illegally.
Hearings, supra note 20, at 92. The funding prohibitions are not, of
course, conditions subsequent under any accepted legal definition of
that term. Nor would it matter if they were.
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the purpose for which funds are appropriated. The principle is
long established that Congress has the exclusive power to specify
how appropriated moneys shall be spent. 116 The only difference
between an appropriation for a specified object (a "line-item")
and an express prohibition against the use of funds for a certain
activity is a semantic one, the positive language of the one contrasting with the negative language of the other. Every appropriations act thus contains "conditions subsequent" in the sense
that each specifies the purposes for which funds are appropriated
-and, by implication, not appropriated. Transfer authority to
take funds from one appropriations account and place them in
another is a statutorily granted privilege, not a constitutional
right.

B. THE PURSE AND THE WAR PowEs RESOLUTION
1.

Subsequent Limitations

That, then, is the status of the congressional power over the
purse: still intact, but under stress and in need of reassertion.
Happily, the two desiderata dovetail at this point: there could
be no more effective reassertion of the appropriations power, and
no better means of strengthening the subsequent limitations of
the Resolution, than placing the power over the purse behind
those limitations-by prohibiting the expenditure of funds for
the use of the armed forces in hostilities after the termination
of the 60-day period 17 or after the adoption of a concurrent
resolution." 8
No statutory scheme constructed in the twilight zone" 9
of the war powers can be entirely immune from constitutional
attack. But a funding cutoff, because it is the product of an
unquestionably 120 exclusive congressional power, is more force116. After 1665, states Hallam, it became "an undisputed principle" that moneys "granted by Parliament, are only to be expended for particular objects specified by itself.. .

."

The

Framers were quite familiar with parliamentary practice; and
we may be sure that in reposing in Congress the power of raising revenues and of making and reviewing appropriations for
support of the armies they conferred the concomitant right to
"specify" the "particular objects upon which its appropriations
are to be expended."
Berger, supra note 23, at 78-79.
117. Resolution § 5 (b).
118. Id. § 5(c).
119. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in note 32 supra.
120. Cf. text accompanying note 115 supra.
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ful constitutionally than the simple termination provisions of sec121
tions 5(b) and 5(c), which derive from the often usurped
and much disputed congressional war-making power. For instance, because the authority of the President to expend appropriated funds is "delegated" while the President's authority to
repel "sudden attacks" is not, use of the purse power to enforce
the subsequent limitations would undermine Mr. Leigh's argument 122 that the concurrent resolution provided for by section
5(c) is an unconstitutional attempt to divest the President of
an undelegated power.
Moreover, innumerable precedents would support the sort
of funding cutoff discussed. Congress clearly has the authority
to make funds available for only a given purpose and a specified
period of time; it does so frequently by prescribing availability
for a particular department or agency within a designated fiscal
year. A prohibition against the use of funds following termination of the 60-day period of section 5(b) would differ from fiscal
year availability only in the sense that the former is contingent
upon the occurrence of a particular event, the submission of a
section 4(a) (1) report. But a cutoff based on a contingency is
hardly unprecedented. 123 Nor is a cutoff by concurrent resolu-

tion innovative.12 4
In summary, even were Mr. Leigh correct in asserting that
a constitutional use of the armed forces cannot be terminated
by the exercise of congressional war-making power, 125 it would
not follow under any but the most extreme of constitutional
theories that Congress cannot refuse to appropriate funds for
that use or that in the absence of an appropriation such use may
continue.
2. PriorRestraints
The advisability of using the appropriations power to bolster
the subsequent limitations of the Resolution leads to an obvious
question. Why should appropriated funds be available for uses
121. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
122. See note 92 supra.
123. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620(x), 22 U.S.C.A. §
2370(x) (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975); International Peace and Security Act of

1961 § 201(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2314(d) (1970).
124. See, e.g., Foreign Military Sales Act § 36(b), 22 U.S.C.A. §
2776(b) (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 617, 22
U.S.C. § 2367 (1970), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2367 (Supp. I1, 1973).

125. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
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of the armed forces in situations not recognized by section 2(c)?
Why should Congress, if it really means what section 2(c) says,
not use its power over the purse to add teeth to that section?
This form of "prior restraint," unlike the prior restraints contained in the Senate version of the War Powers Resolution, 26
would not be subject to the objection that a constitutional power
is being circumscribed by statute: 127 Whether the President's
war-making power is broader than recognized by section 2(c)
would be beside the point since no military activity can be carried
out in the absence of funds. The question is not even whether
the congressional power over the purse can be used to deprive the
President of his powers as commander in chief (or vice versa),
since it is possible to read the constitutional provisions together
as contemplating a chief executive who exercises a war-making
power as extensive as the Constitution and appropriated funds
allow.128

In fact, this is precisely the scheme the Framers

12 9

intended.
Thus there would be several advantages to including a funding prohibition in section 2(c) as well. First, it would prevent
unwanted presidential military excursions at the outset by denying funds to a President who intended to operate beyond the
congressionally recognized limits of his power. Second, it would
obviate the need for Congress, in order to prevent unauthorized
presidential use of armed force, to hurriedly legislate ad hoc
authorizations, limitations, and prohibitions every time the occasion arises. The scope of the President's independent authority
to use the armed forces in an emergency situation would already
be defined. Third, as with the subsequent limitations of section
5, prior restraints tied to the purse strings would be virtually
immune from constitutional challenge and would thus provide
a needed predictability that they would be respected in times of
crisis. Including funding cutoffs would ensure, in short, that
during the next involvement of the armed forces in hostilities,
the Resolution will not be largely irrelevant.
If section 2(c) is thus amended to impose prior restraints
upon independent presidential action, however, it should also be
modified in several other respects. First, as Professor Berger
recommended in discussing the Senate version of the War Powers
126.
127.
128.
129.

S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973), quoted in note 13 supra.
See note 15 supra.
See notes 104-14 supra and accompanying text.
Id.
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Resolution,130 independent presidential introduction of armed
forces into hostilities should be sanctioned only where Congress
is unable to act rapidly enough to be effective. Such a qualification would conform the presidential war-making power to its
most appropriate constitutional interpretation, 1 3 thus reducing
the risk that the President will commit the nation to hostilities
that Congress would have chosen to avoid.
Second, the section should be broadened to sanction, as did
the Senate version of the Resolution,132 independent presidential use of armed force to evacuate United States citizens endangered abroad under certain narrowly defined circumstances.
Here again, however, the President should be permitted to act
only where Congress cannot act rapidly enough. 33 This expansion is advisable because Presidents will probably assume the
authority to act in such situations regardless of a lack of congressional authorization; thus Congress will be in a stronger position if it authorizes, rather than merely acquiesces in, their
actions, for acquiescence would suggest that a President may constitutionally act without congressional authorization in still
other situations not enumerated by the section.
Finally, the section, if so expanded to sanction certain presidential evacuations of United States citizens, should not purport,
as it presently does, to define the constitutional scope of the
President's power. In the first place, such a definition would be
unnecessary if the section were coupled with purse-strings limitations. More importantly, it is not at all clear that the President can constitutionally evacuate United States citizens in any
circumstances if Congress prescribes such action.1 34 Therefore
a congressional concession that he can would undermine later
congressional action denying that the President has such authority. Moreover, such a concession would support presidential assertions of constitutional authority to use armed force in situations somewhat analogous to but potentially more explosive than
evacuation of United States citizens-e.g., the rescue of captured
United States citizens, as in the Mayaguez incident.' 35
130. Berger, supra note 23, at 47.
131. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text; note 92 supra.
132. S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(3) (1973).
133. With this modification, the Vietnam Contingency Act, S. 1484,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1975), see notes 56-58 supra and accompanying
text, would provide a good model for broadening section 2 (c).
134. See notes 22, 23, and 29 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 89 supra.
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OTHER POSSMILITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

This Article has dealt with only the major possibilities
for strengthening the War Powers Resolution. The events discussed, however, suggest the possibility of further improvements.
(1) Reference to the "introduction" of the armed forces into
hostilities may not cover all situations that should trigger the
reporting requirement of section 4(a) (1) and the subsequent
limitation of sections 5(b) and 5(c). During the evacuation of
Saigon, two marines on "regular duty" at Tan Son Nhut Airfield
were killed. No report was submitted with respect to this
action. Arguably the incident did not constitute "hostilities."
(Perhaps a definition of "hostilities" should be included in the
Resolution, since in the absence thereof the executive branch has
formulated its own. 136) But the important question raised by
the Tan Son Nhut incident is whether a report should be required
when hostilities arise involving forces that have not been "introduced" into such hostilities. Use of the term "committed," as
in the House version of the Resolution, 137 might be desirable.
(2) Section 5(b) provides that the 60-day time limit is
triggered when a report is submitted or is "required to be submitted." The difficulty is, of course, who determines when the
report was required to be submitted? Congress? The courts?
There is no assurance that every President will "take note of"
this requirement. Even if one assumes good faith on the part of a
President, a gradual escalation of hostilities could generate
honest differences of opinion as to the date on which the report
was required to be submitted. This potential ambiguity can be
easily remedied by allowing Congress, if it believes a report
should have been submitted but was not, to so state by concurrent resolution and to set the date on which the 60-day
requirement was triggered.
(3) It may be desirable to require the President to specify
the paragraph of section 4(a) under which the report is submitted. President Ford did not do so in the second and third
reports, submitted during the evacuations from Cambodia and
Vietnam. 38 Had the hostilities gradually increased, serious disagreement could have arisen as to whether the 60-day period had
been triggered by the report.
(4) Under section 5(c) the concurrent resolution termination procedure is not available in the event the 60-day period
136. See note 41 supra.
137. H.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3(1), (2) (1973).
138. See notes 40, 41, and 68 supraamd accompanying text.
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is extended or in the event specific statutory authorization is
enacted. Any specific statutory authorization conferred in the
future will probably solve this problem by including the language of section 5 of the Vietnam Contingency Act, which provided, in effect, that the concurrent resolution procedure remained applicable notwithstanding its inapplicability as a result
of the enactment of that Act. 1 39 To eliminate the need to recite
that paradoxical provision, section 5 should be amended to apply
the concurrent resolution termination procedure to situations in
which the armed forces are used pursuant to specific statutory
authority.
(5) Section 8(a) of the Resolution prohibits the inference
from any treaty or "provision of law," whether or not in effect
prior to enactment of the Resolution, of presidential authority
to introduce the armed forces into hostilities, unless the provision states that it is "intended to constitute specific statutory
140
authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.'
Thus the Resolution prohibits any such inference from provisions
of law such as the Middle East Peace and Stability Act' 41 and
the Cuban Resolution'14--both of which were joint resolutions
enacted prior to the War Powers Resolution and could be construed, in the absence of the latter, to authorize presidential introduction of the armed forces into hostilities.
As presently written, however, section 8 (a) does not prohibit the President from inferring such authority from the
Berlin Resolution,143 because it is a concurrent resolution, not
a "provision of law," or from various provisions of the September
1, 1975 Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments
of Israel and the United States, 4 4 because the agreement was
an executive agreement rather than a treaty. Therefore the section should be broadened to include concurrent resolutions and
executive agreements as well as laws and treaties.
(6) The effect of subsection (d) (1) of section 8-providing
that no provision of the Resolution is "intended to alter ... the
139. S. 1484, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1975).
140. :Resolution §§ 8 (a) (1), (2).
141. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1961-65 (1970).
142. 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
143. 76 Stat. 1429 (1962).
144. Hearings on Memoranda of Agreements Between the Governments of Israel and the United States Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 249-51 (1975). During the
Senate debate on the Sinai Implementation Agreement, Pub. L. No.
94-110 (Oct. 13, 1975), there was considerable controversy over whether
the September 1 Memorandum could be construed to authorize introduction of the armed forces into hostilities.
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provisions of existing treaties"-is unclear, since presumably the
purpose of subsection (a) (2) is to alter existing treaties (under
domestic law) to the extent that they may be construed to
authorize the introduction of armed forces into hostilities. Monroe Leigh, not surprisingly, has claimed independent constituarmed
tional authority on the part of the President to use the
145
forces "to carry out the terms of security ... treaties.)
The apparent conflict between subsections (d) (1) and
(a) (2) should be clarified.
V. CONCLUSION
Enactment of the War Powers Resolution may have been "a
crucial first step in reestablishing the constitutional balance so
essential to the survival and proper functioning of our democratic political system."'1 4 6 But it was only a first step. During
the Mayaguez incident and the evacuations from Cambodia and
South Vietnam, Congress acquiesced in statutorily prohibited and
constitutionally dubious military actions ordered by the President. The Resolution should not be viewed as a license for the
abnegation by Congress of its constitutionally granted war and
appropriations powers. Regardless of whether the policies behind those actions were wise, renunciation by Congress of its
proper constitutional role can only abet excessive claims of executive authority and provide precedential support for military
activities based on those claims. Enactment of amendments
to the War Powers Resolution of the sort proposed in this Article
would weaken those precedents and help secure a constitutional
balance more in conformity with that intended by the Framers.
The criticisms recently directed at the Resolution by State
Department Legal Advisor Monroe Leigh demonstrate that disagreements concerning the legal underpinnings of the Resolution have not been resolved since its enactment. They simply
have not been forced to the surface by events. Consideration
of amendments that would strengthen the Resolution and alleviate the discord could proceed more calmly now than amid the
heated emotions and constitutional myopia inevitably generated
by the nation's involvement in armed conflict. Peacetime legal
arrangements have proven far more successful in preserving
democratic principles than have wartime political accommodations.
145. Hearings, supra note 20, at 90.
146. War Powers Legislation, supra note 21, at 129 (remarks of
Senator Javits).
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Appendix
JOINT RESOLUTION
Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the 'War Powers
Resolution".
PURPOSE AND POLICY

SEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the
intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and
insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically
provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers
but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-inChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a
declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces.
CONSULTATION

SEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with
Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall
consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces
are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such
situations.
REPORTING

SEC. 4.

(a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in

which United States Armed Forces are introduced(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation,
while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate
solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States
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Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign
nation;
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a
report, in writing, setting forth(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United
States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which
such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the
Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of
United States Armed Forces abroad.
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into
hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section,
the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged
in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on
the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and
duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report
to the Congress less often than once every six months.
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
SEC. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) shall
be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to
the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day.
Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when
the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has
adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the
Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent
of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the
President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report
and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is
required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1), whichever is
earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed
Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required
to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has
enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed
Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United
States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an
additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the
Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the
safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such
armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such
forces.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States
Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the
United States, its possessions and teritories without a declaration of
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war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed
by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL

SEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the
sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and
such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together
with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days
before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section,
unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the
time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and
the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be
referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a)
and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before
the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The
joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of
the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days
after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine
by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of
Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses,
conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference
shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not
later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day
period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable

to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective
Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House
concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be
acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day

period.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be
reported out by such committee together with its recommendations
within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending
business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time
for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the
opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter,
unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be
referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a)
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and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become
the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within
three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by
yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of
Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both
Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of
conference shall make and file a repor. with respect to such concurrent
resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to
the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House
concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report
shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after
the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to
agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses
in disagreement.
INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION

SEc. 8.
(a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before
the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any
provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision
specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is
intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of this joint resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such
treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require
any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of
United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of
the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters
operations of high-level military commands which were established prior
to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the
United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States
prior to such date.
(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of
United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of
such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any
foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged,
or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become
engaged, in hostilities.
(d) Nothing in this joint resolution(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities
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is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would
not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.
SEPARABLITY CLAUSE

SEC. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of
the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other
person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 10.
enactment.

This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its

